The problem of evil and the attributes of God

Abstract
In discussions of the probabilistic argument from evil, some defenders of theism have recently argued that evil has no evidential force against theism. They base their argument on the claim that there is no reason to think that we should be able to discern morally sufficient reasons which God presumably has for permitting the evil which occurs. In this paper I try to counter this argument by discussing factors which suggest that we should generally be able to discern why God permits evil events. I close by suggesting that the theist use the evidential force which evil does have as a reason to question her understanding of the divine attributes.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00142861
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,122
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
God and Gratuitous Evil.Klaas J. Kraay - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):913-922.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
96 ( #54,945 of 2,191,269 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #95,455 of 2,191,269 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature