International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 (3):155 - 171 (1989)
In discussions of the probabilistic argument from evil, some defenders of theism have recently argued that evil has no evidential force against theism. They base their argument on the claim that there is no reason to think that we should be able to discern morally sufficient reasons which God presumably has for permitting the evil which occurs. In this paper I try to counter this argument by discussing factors which suggest that we should generally be able to discern why God permits evil events. I close by suggesting that the theist use the evidential force which evil does have as a reason to question her understanding of the divine attributes.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
On Rowe's Argument From Particular Horrors.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2005 - In Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Religion. Broadview.
Evidential Arguments From Evil.Richard Otte - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1):1-10.
INTRODUCTION: The Evidential Argument From Evil.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1996 - In The Evidential Argument from Evil.
On the a Priori Rejection of Evidential Arguments From Evil.Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne - 1994 - Sophia:33-47.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads94 ( #54,004 of 2,158,843 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #64,582 of 2,158,843 )
How can I increase my downloads?