Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96 (2002)

In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we should think about the rationality of a number of other propositional attitudes,such as regret, desire, and fear. Finally,I suggest that a lack of clarity with respect to the relevant issues has given rise to a number of rather serious philosophical mistakes
Keywords Belief  Consequence  Epistemology  Normative  Propositional Attitudes  Rationality
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/a:1020212716425
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,289
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Critique of Practical Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1788 - Hackett Publishing Company.

View all 50 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
Responsibility for Believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.

View all 85 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Believing That I Am Thinking.Tom Stoneham - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.
The Normativity of the Mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
Against Essential Normativity of the Mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
Propositional Attitudes in Fiction.John Zeimbekis - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.


Added to PP index

Total views
349 ( #25,009 of 2,444,988 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #47,082 of 2,444,988 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes