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Abstract
Judgment subjectivism is the view that x is good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that S believes, under the proper conditions, that x is good for S. In this paper, I offer three related arguments against the theory. The arguments are about what judgment subjectivism implies about the well-being of welfare nihilists, people who believe there are no welfare properties, or at least that none are instantiated. I maintain that welfare nihilists can be benefited and harmed. Judgment subjectivism is implausible because it implies otherwise.
Keywords well-being  judgment subjectivism  welfare nihilism  the resonance constraint  the alienation constraint
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v19i3.886
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Well-Being.Roger Crisp - 2017 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.

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