Welfare and the achievement of goals

Philosophical Studies 121 (1):27-41 (2004)

Authors
Simon Keller
Victoria University of Wellington
Abstract
I defend the view that an individual''s welfareis in one respect enhanced by the achievementof her goals, even when her goals are crazy,self-destructive, irrational or immoral. This``Unrestricted View'''' departs from familiartheories which take welfare to involve only theachievement of rational aims, or of goals whoseobjects are genuinely valuable, or of goalsthat are not grounded in bad reasons. I beginwith a series of examples, intended to showthat some of our intuitive judgments aboutwelfare incorporate distinctions that only theUnrestricted View can support. Then, I show howthe view can be incorporated into a broadertheory of welfare in ways that do not produceimplausible consequences. This in hand, Ifinish by providing a more philosophicalstatement of the Unrestricted View and the casein its favor, and respond to some objections.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000040377.50002.88
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The Value of Achievements.Gwen Bradford - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):204-224.
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Not Always Worth the Effort: Difficulty and the Value of Achievement.Sukaina Hirji - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):525-548.
Multi‐Component Theories of Well‐Being and Their Structure.Alexander Sarch - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):439-471.

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