Zetetic Indispensability and Epistemic Justification

Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one's belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful inquirer for creatures like us. The argument builds on Enoch's (2007, 2011) deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism but avoids relying on an overly pragmatic account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. In particular, I argue that the sources of basic epistemic justification are those belief-forming methods which are indispensable for zetetically indispensable projects, that is, projects which are constitutive of being a successful inquirer for embodied, agential creatures like ourselves.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Inquiry and the epistemic.David Thorstad - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2913-2928.
Reconciling the Epistemic and the Zetetic.Eliran Haziza - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):93-100.
The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):2977-3002.
Causal reference and epistemic justification.Jane Duran - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (2):272-279.
Theories of justification.Richard Fumerton - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 204--233.
An instrumentalist unification of zetetic and epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Is lucky belief justified?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Chisholm's Internalism and Its Consequences.Richard Feldman - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (5):603-620.


Added to PP

115 (#140,871)

6 months
115 (#26,596)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mikayla Kelley
University of Chicago

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations