Concepts, anomalies and reality: a response to Bloor and Fehér


Abstract
In this article I respond to the defences of the Strong Programme put forward by David Bloor and Márta Fehér in this issue. I dispute the claim that it is attention to only limited parts of the Strong Programme framework that allows me to argue that this approach: leads to weak idealism, undermines the idea that theories have varying levels of instrumental success, and challenges the theoretical claims of scientific actors. Rather, I argue that these problematic positions are entailed by the constructionist tenets at the core of the Strong Programme.Keywords: Strong Programme; David Bloor; Social constructionism; Idealism; Self-Reference; Anomalies.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.12.005
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,836
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Anti-Latour.David Bloor - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (1):81-112.
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers.Imre Lakatos, John Worrall & Gregory Currie - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):381-402.
Ideals and Monisms: Recent Criticisms of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge.David Bloor - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):210-234.
Saving the Strong Programme? A Critique of David Bloor’s Recent Work.Stephen Kemp - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):707-720.
Toward a Monistic Theory of Science: The `Strong Programme' Reconsidered.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Saving the Strong Programme: A Critique of Stephen Kemp’s Recent Paper.Márta Fehér - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):235-240.
Saving the Strong Programme? A Critique of David Bloor’s Recent Work.Stephen Kemp - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):707-720.
The Social Construction of Social Constructionism.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):139 – 157.
Ideals and Monisms: Recent Criticisms of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge.David Bloor - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):210-234.
Bloor's Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme.Peter Slezak - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):241 – 256.
Relativism and the Sociology of Mathematics: Remarks on Bloor, Flew, and Frege.Timm Triplett - 1986 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4):439-450.
Bad Arguments Against a Good Case (Laudan's Attack on the Strong Programme).Márta Fehér - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):233-238.
The "Strong Programme", Normativity, and Social Causes.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2008 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (1):1–22.
A Second Look at David Bloor's: Knowledge and Social Imagery.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):336-361.
Alternative Mathematics and the Strong Programme: Reply to Triplett.Richard C. Jennings - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):93 – 101.
Toward a Monistic Theory of Science: The `Strong Programme' Reconsidered.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338.
How Strong is Dr. Bloor's 'Strong Programme'?Gad Freudenthal - 1979 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (1):67.
Naturalized Epistemology, or What the Strong Programme Can’T Explain.Karyn L. Freedman - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):135-148.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-09-02

Total views
17 ( #497,619 of 2,266,097 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #855,138 of 2,266,097 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature