Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338 (2003)

Abstract
This article considers the `Strong Programme' account of scientific knowledge from a fresh perspective. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the Strong Programme's monistic intent, that is, its aim to unify considerations of instrumental adequacy and social interests in explanations of the development of scientific knowledge. Although sharing the judgment of many critics that the Strong Programme approach is flawed, the article diverges from standard criticisms by suggesting that the best alternative is not a dualistic framework but a more adequate monistic approach. Key Words: Strong Programme • interests • monism • finitism • classification.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0048393103252780
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,548
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Anti-Latour.David Bloor - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (1):81-112.
Discussion.Brad Hooker - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (1):113-129.
A Second Look at David Bloor's: Knowledge and Social Imagery.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):336-361.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Ideals and Monisms: Recent Criticisms of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge.David Bloor - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):210-234.
Saving the Strong Programme? A Critique of David Bloor’s Recent Work.Stephen Kemp - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):707-720.
Rethinking Social Criticism: Rules, Logic and Internal Critique.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - History of the Human Sciences 16 (4):61-84.
Concepts, Anomalies and Reality: A Response to Bloor and Fehér.Stephen Kemp - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):241-253.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Underdetermination of Theory by Data and the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge.Samir Okasha - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.
Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.
Conventionalism, Scientific Discovery and the Sociology of Knowledge.Angelo M. Petroni - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):225 – 240.
Can Relativism Be Reconciled with Realism and Causalism?Barbara Tuchańska - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):285-294.
Bloor's Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme.Peter Slezak - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):241 – 256.
Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences Within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge.Edward Manier - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:197-207.
Bad Arguments Against a Good Case (Laudan's Attack on the Strong Programme).Márta Fehér - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):233-238.
The Social Construction of Social Constructionism.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):139 – 157.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
23 ( #433,200 of 2,348,443 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #329,213 of 2,348,443 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes