Toward a monistic theory of science: The `strong programme' reconsidered

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338 (2003)
This article considers the `Strong Programme' account of scientific knowledge from a fresh perspective. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the Strong Programme's monistic intent, that is, its aim to unify considerations of instrumental adequacy and social interests in explanations of the development of scientific knowledge. Although sharing the judgment of many critics that the Strong Programme approach is flawed, the article diverges from standard criticisms by suggesting that the best alternative is not a dualistic framework but a more adequate monistic approach. Key Words: Strong Programme • interests • monism • finitism • classification.
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DOI 10.1177/0048393103252780
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Stephen Kemp (2005). Saving the Strong Programme? A Critique of David Bloor's Recent Work. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):707-720.
Stephen Kemp (2007). Concepts, Anomalies and Reality: A Response to Bloor and Fehér. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):241-253.

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