Oxford University Press (2001)

Authors
Jeanette Kennett
Macquarie University
Abstract
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance.Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness - and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.
Keywords Ethics  Will  Self-control
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Reprint years 2003
Call number BJ45.K46 2001
ISBN(s) 0198236581   9780199266302   0199266301   9780198236580
DOI 10.1093/mind/111.444.876
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Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Hanna Pickard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):135-163.
Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism?Jeanette Kennett - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.

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