Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49 (2003)
The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and that there is little theoretical motivation to yield to that view in light of the fact that the core symptoms of DID bear remarkable similarity to the symptoms of these other disorders where no such extravagance is ever seriously entertained.
|Keywords||Delusion Disorder Identity Metaphysics Mind Multiple Personality Mayo, H|
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References found in this work BETA
Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory.Ian Hacking - 1995 - Princeton University Press.
When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2000 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Dissociative Identity Disorder and Ambivalence.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):223-237.
Dissociative Identity: An Objection to Baker's Constitution Theory.Edward Andrew Greetis - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):329-341.
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