In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press. pp. 221-254 (2013)

Authors
Matthew Kennedy
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Michael Martin aims to affirm a certain pattern of first-person thinking by advocating disjunctivism, a theory of perceptual experience which combines naive realism with the epistemic conception of hallucination. In this paper I argue that we can affirm the pattern of thinking in question without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The first part of my paper explains the link that Martin draws between the first-person thinking and the epistemic conception of hallucination. The second part of my paper explains how we can achieve Martin’s ambition without Martin’s theory. One resource that I enlist for this purpose is a naive-realist friendly conception of first-person access to experience. The metaphysical theory that I enlist is a form of naive realism that endorses an intentionalist or representationalist “common-factor” approach to veridical and hallucinatory experience. The third part of my paper briefly develops this theory.
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DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.003.0010
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.
Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism.Michael Sollberger - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.
The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

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