Synthese 191 (11):2529-2547 (2014)

Authors
Tim Kenyon
University of Waterloo
Abstract
False polarization (FP) is an interpersonal bias on judgement, the effect of which is to lead people in contexts of disagreement to overestimate the differences between their respective views. I propose to treat FP as a problem of applied social epistemology—a barrier to reliable belief-formation in certain social domains—and to ask how best one may debias for FP. This inquiry leads more generally into questions about effective debiasing strategies; on this front, considerable empirical evidence suggests that intuitively attractive strategies for debiasing are not very effective, while more effective strategies are neither intuitive nor likely to be easily implemented. The supports for more effective debiasing seem either to be inherently social and cooperative, or at least to presuppose social efforts to create physical or decision-making infrastructure for mitigating bias. The upshot, I argue, is that becoming a less biased epistemic agent is a thoroughly socialized project
Keywords Social epistemology  Bias  Debiasing  False polarization
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0438-x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Goldman - 1986 - Erkenntnis 34 (1):117-123.
Debiasing/Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. And Tversky, A.B. Fischhoff - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
Debiasing. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky, Eds.B. Fischsoff - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Biased Thinkers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.
The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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