Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency

Abstract
Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia and the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue for naïve realism and against representationalism and the qualia theory. I also examine the relationship between phenomenological study and phenomenal character, and discuss the results in connection with the argument from hallucination.
Keywords perception  naive realism  transparency  representationalism  qualia
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00294.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,812
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):137-49.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
Type 2 Blindsight and the Nature of Visual Experience.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
Naïve Realism: A Simple Approach.Justin Christy - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
What's so Transparent About Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
Scents and Sensibilia.Clare Batty - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):103-118.
Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.
Transparency and the Unity of Experience.John O'Dea - 2008 - In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 299.
The Argument From Diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - In M. Escurdia, Robert J. Stainton & Christopher D. Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Alberta Press. pp. 341--90.
Added to PP index
2009-01-31

Total downloads
440 ( #6,482 of 2,231,614 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #41,863 of 2,231,614 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature