Abstract

Much has been written in the philosophical literature during the past twenty-five years on the proper place of impartiality in ethics. Critics of Kantian and consequentialist ethics have charged that these theories undermine the personal integrity of moral agents who conscientiously attempt to follow their guidance. Feminists have claimed that the moral experience of many women is ignored by these theories, arguing that moral responses rooted in care and compassion should not, as a group, be considered inferior to those which stress impartial reason. Other critics have noted the way in which compassion and sympathy enhance our ability to perceive the moral features of situations and hence our ability to respond appropriately. ;This dissertation treats the impartiality debate as primarily a debate over the scope and structure of the moral domain. What these criticisms have in common is a concern about what counts as a moral value. Whether the issue is the existence of a different voice in ethics, as feminists contend, or the assertion that a properly conceived moral theory should not be a threat to personal integrity, or the simple claim that the possession of a sympathetic character is morally valuable in its own right, in each case the critics contend that the moral domain is broader than Kantian and consequentialist theories are traditionally willing to recognize. ;Although some consequentialist ideas are discussed, the primary focus is on Kantian ethics. The ideas of several critics are examined, including those of Michael Stocker, Lawrence Blum, and Annette Baier. The rebuttals of Kantian defenders are also considered, especially those offered by Barbara Herman, Marcia Baron, and Kurt Baier. In the end, the central criticism of the "partialist" critique, that Kantian ethics must recognize a broader moral domain, is upheld