Naive realism and experiential evidence

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):77-109 (2010)
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Abstract

I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs

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Matthew Kennedy
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Armchair Access and Imagination.Giada Fratantonio - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):525-547.
Is Margaret Cavendish a Naïve Realist?Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
The skeptic and the naïve realist.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
Evidential externalism.Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.

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