Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):77-109 (2010)
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Abstract |
I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00280.x |
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References found in this work BETA
Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism.Giada Fratantonio & Aidan McGlynn - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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2010-04-25
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161 ( #72,753 of 2,506,521 )
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3 ( #209,726 of 2,506,521 )
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