Naive realism and experiential evidence

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):77-109 (2010)
Authors
Matthew Kennedy
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00280.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
Evidential Externalism.Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.

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