Personal Identity in the Thought of William James and Paul Weiss
Dissertation, The Catholic University of America (
1990)
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Abstract
In his recent work, Privacy, Paul Weiss offers a metaphysical theory of human nature, which grounds personal identity in what Weiss calls the "I." However, neither this reality nor the "privacy" which it is said to epitomize is empirically observable. William James, conversely, construes personal identity strictly as the result of the resemblance and continuity between objective contents of the "stream of consciousness." While Weiss' ontology reflects the anthropology of common sense more adequately than James' account, its metaphysical character may also appear more controversial, at least in some contemporary circles, than James' phenomenalism. ;The dissertation evaluates the plausibility of Weiss' metaphysical theory by subjecting it to critical exposition using James' account of personal identity as a foil. The similarities uncovered suggest a favorable interpretation of Weiss' effort, placing it within the pragmatic tradition of Peirce, James, and Dewey . Two specific similarities, which correspond to the pragmatic, fallibilistic, and commonsensist character of the American tradition, are examined. First, introspection is regarded as a useful tool by James and Weiss because they do not conceive it in the Cartesian manner which Peirce assailed. Secondly, James' critique of "scholastic" explanations of personal identity, based as it is on a caricature, fails to undermine Weiss' metaphysical theory about privacy and the I. In fact, both thinkers reject any notion of an immediately self-conscious, substantial soul. ;Weiss' arguments for his metaphysical turn include: a phenomenology of interpersonal relations based on the use of personal pronouns, a theory of the intensive magnitude and adumbration of the I, and a characterization of this whole metaphysical procedure as "cautious" or fallible. While persuasive, the arguments, being based on common sense beliefs, are not conclusive. Further, an investigation of the metaphors relied on by both James and Weiss reveals crucial limitations. Nevertheless, a certain convergence around ideas of "focus," "center," and "intensity" within a "field" is noted which provides support to Weiss' account. Finally, Weiss' theory is included in a pluralistic view of the American tradition