The mathematical philosophy of Giuseppe peano

Philosophy of Science 30 (3):262-266 (1963)
Abstract
Because Bertrand Russell adopted much of the logical symbolism of Peano, because Russell always had a high regard for the great Italian mathematician, and because Russell held the logicist thesis so strongly, many English-speaking mathematicians have been led to classify Peano as a logicist, or at least as a forerunner of the logicist school. An attempt is made here to deny this by showing that Peano's primary interest was in axiomatics, that he never used the mathematical logic developed by him for the reduction of mathematical concepts to logical concepts, and that, instead, he denied the validity of such a reduction
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DOI 10.1086/287940
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