Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):153-165 (2010)

Authors
Stephen Kershnar
Fredonia State University
Abstract
In this paper, I argue for the Complex Experiential Theory. It asserts that pleasure is a pro-attitude toward a de se experience. I argue that it is better than its competitors. In particular, it is better than monadic theories that view pleasure as a distinct type of experience or a pro-attitude in isolation. It is also better than other non-monadic theories. In particular, it is better than accounts that involve pro-attitudes and beliefs in states of affairs or propositions (or ones that obtain, are true, or that focus on the subject’s own life). When conjoined with hedonism, this theory fits nicely into a building block theory of well-being.
Keywords Pleasure  Complex Experiential Theory  Pro-Attitude  Hedonism  Well-Being   Self-Interest  Intrinsic Value
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-010-9220-6
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References found in this work BETA

Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.Derek Parfit - 1986 - In Peter Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-164.
Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Consequentialist Reply to the Objection From Justice.Fred Feldman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):567-585.
Explaining the Geometry of Desert.Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar - 2004 - Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):273-298.

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