Episteme 4 (3):368-381 (2007)

Authors
Arnon Keren
University of Haifa
Abstract
I present an account of what it is to trust a speaker, and argue that the account can explain the common intuitions which structure the debate about the transmission view of testimony. According to the suggested account, to trust a speaker is to grant her epistemic authority on the asserted proposition, and hence to see her opinion as issuing a second order, preemptive reason for believing the proposition. The account explains the intuitive appeal of the basic principle associated with the transmission view of testimony: the principle according to which, a listener can normally obtain testimonial knowledge that p by believing a speaker who testifies that p only if the speaker knows that p. It also explains a common response to counterexamples to this principle: that these counterexamples do not involve normal cases of testimonial knowledge
Keywords Epistemic Authority  Trust  Testimony  Epistemology  Knowledge Transmission
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DOI 10.3366/E1742360007000147
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Knowing and Asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemological Problems of Testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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