On the alleged perversity of the evidential view of testimony

Analysis 72 (4):700-707 (2012)
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Abstract

According to the evidential view of testimony (EVT), the epistemic value of testimony is its value as evidence. Richard Moran has argued that because testimony is deliberately produced with the intention of making audiences form a belief, its value as evidence for the attested proposition is diminished; as a result, EVT cannot explain why we regard testimony as such a significant source of knowledge. I argue that this argument against EVT fails, because there is no reason to think that the deliberate nature of testimony diminishes its value as evidence

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Arnon Keren
University of Haifa

Citations of this work

Epistemological problems of testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.
Testimony, evidence and interpersonal reasons.Nick Leonard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2333-2352.

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References found in this work

Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.
Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
``Knowing and Asserting".Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.

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