Trust and belief: a preemptive reasons account

Synthese 191 (12):2593-2615 (2014)
Abstract
According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to \(\varPhi \) involves, among other things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will \(\varPhi \) . In recent years, several philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, or a non-doxastic disposition to rely upon her. This paper offers a new account of reasons for trust and employs the account to defend a doxastic account of trust. The paper argues that reasons for trust are preemptive reasons for action or belief. Thus the Razian concept of preemptive reasons, which arguably plays a key role in our understanding of relations of authority, is also central to our understanding of relations of trust. Furthermore, the paper argues that acceptance of a preemptive account of reasons for trust supports the adoption of a doxastic account of trust, for acceptance of such an account both neutralizes central objections to doxastic accounts of trust and provides independent reasons supporting a doxastic account
Keywords Trust  Belief  Reason  Testimony  Authority  Epistemic Authority  Joseph Raz
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0416-3
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References found in this work BETA
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.

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Citations of this work BETA
Trust in the Guise of Belief.Anthony Robert Booth - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):156-172.
Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
Commitment in Cases of Trust and Distrust.Jonathan Tallant - 2017 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly (4):261-267.

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