In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy. New York, USA: pp. 109-120 (forthcoming)

Authors
Arnon Keren
University of Haifa
Abstract
One fundamental divide among philosophers studying the nature of trust concerns the relation between trust and belief. According to doxastic accounts of trust, trust entails a belief about the trustee: either the belief that she is trustworthy with respect to what she is trusted to do, or that she will do what she is trusted to do. Non-doxastic accounts deny that trusting entails holding such a belief. The chapter describes and evaluates the main considerations which have been cited for and against doxastic accounts of trust. It argues that a preemptive reasons account of trust neutralizes some of the key objections to doxastic accounts, and that considerations favoring a doxastic account appear to be stronger than those favoring non-doxastic accounts. The chapter also suggests that the debate about the nature of trust, and the mental state required for trusting can benefit from linking it with the debate about the value of trust.
Keywords Trust  belief  Evidentialism
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Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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