Beth's theorem and deflationism — reply to Bays

Mind 118 (472):1075-1079 (2009)
Is the restricted, consistent, version of the T-scheme sufficient for an ‘implicit definition’ of truth? In a sense, the answer is yes (Haack 1978 , Quine 1953 ). Section 4 of Ketland 1999 mentions this but gives a result saying that the T-scheme does not implicitly define truth in the stronger sense relevant for Beth’s Definability Theorem. This insinuates that the T-scheme fares worse than the compositional truth theory as an implicit definition. However, the insinuation is mistaken. For, as Bays rightly points out, the result given extends to the compositional truth theory also. So, as regards implicit definability, both kinds of truth theory are equivalent. Some further discussion of this topic is mentioned (Gupta 2008 , Ketland 2003 , McGee 1991 ), all in agreement with Bays’s analysis
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzp133
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Proof and Truth: Through Thick and Thin.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.
Reflecting on Incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
How Innocent is Deflationism?Volker Halbach - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):167 - 194.
Beth's Theorem and Deflationism.Timothy Bays - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1061-1073.

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