Deflationism and the gödel phenomena: Reply to Tennant

Mind 114 (453):75-88 (2005)
Abstract
Any (1-)consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a nontrivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called 'semantical argument' for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that the deflationist has at his disposal such extended methods--methods which make no use or mention of a truth-predicate. (edited)
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzi075
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Substantivism About Truth.Gila Sher - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):818-828.
Arithmetical Reflection and the Provability of Soundness.Walter Dean - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1):31-64.
Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality.Cezary Cieśliński - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.

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