A Dilemma for Personal Identity

Peter Kügler
University of Innsbruck
Some theories of personal identity allow persons to lose their identities in processes of qualitative change, i.e., to become a numerically different person by getting new physical and/or psychological properties. I shall call these theories strong. Weak theories, in contrast, do not allow for such a loss of identity. In general, weak theories put less restrictions on personal identity than strong ones. I will argue that each type of theory faces a serious problem
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