Economics and Philosophy 6 (2):255-273 (1990)

I attempt a reconstruction of Adam Smith's view of human nature as explicated in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith's view of human conduct is neither functionalist nor reductionist, but interactionist. The moral autonomy of the individual, conscience, is neither made a function of public approval nor reduced to self-contained impulses of altruism and egoism. Smith does not see human conduct as a blend of independently defined impulses. Rather, conduct is unified, by the underpinning sentiment of sympathy.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0266267100001243
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,194
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.
The Nature of Sympathy.Max Scheler, Peter Heath & W. Stark - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (4):671-673.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life.James R. Otteson - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.David R. Raynor - 1984 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1):51-79.
The Adam Smith Problem Revisited: A Methodological Resolution.Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto - 2013 - Journal de Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 19 (1):63-99.
Das Adam Smith Problem - A Critical Realist Perspective.David Wilson & William Dixon - 2006 - Journal of Critical Realism 5 (2):251-272.
Adam Smith and the Limits of Sympathy.Duncan Kelly - 2013 - In Christopher J. Berry, Maria Pia Paganelli & Craig Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith. Oxford University Press. pp. 201.
Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Knud Haakonssen (ed.) - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352.


Added to PP index

Total views
77 ( #139,019 of 2,448,308 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #226,806 of 2,448,308 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes