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Abstract
The distinction that Ainslie draws among the triple-phenomena “suppression,” “resolve,” and “habit” is a great advance in decision making theory. But the conceptual machinery “willpower,” and its underpinning distinction between small/soon rewards as opposed to large/later rewards, provides a faulty framework to understand the triple-phenomena.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x20000941
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Wellbeing and Happiness.Elias L. Khalil - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (4):627-652.
Wellbeing and Happiness.Elias L. Khalil - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (4):627-652.

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