Interactionist Zombies

Synthese 200 (2022)
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Abstract

One of the most popular arguments in favor of dualism is the zombie-conceivability argument. It is often argued that the possibility of zombies would entail that mental properties are epiphenomenal. This paper attempts to defuse the argument, offering a model of dualist mental causation which can serve as a basis for a modified, interactionist-friendly zombie argument.

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10.1007/s11229-022-03970-x

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Jake Khawaja
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Mental Causation for Standard Dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):978-998.

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References found in this work

Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
After Physics.David Z. Albert - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

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