Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value

In Michela Massimi & Ana-Maria Cretu (eds.), Knowledge From A Human Point of View. Dordrecht: Springer (forthcoming)

Jared A. Millson
Agnes Scott College
Kareem Khalifa
Middlebury College
Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism,” which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and background assumptions. Using examples of several different scientific practices, we argue that inquisitive truth monism outperforms true-belief monism.
Keywords perspective  questions  epistemic value  truth  belief  modeling  idealization
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford, UK: pp. 123-145.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
Truth Promoting Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.
In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
Epistemic Value. Curiosity, Knowledge and Response-Dependence.Nenad Miščević - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):393-417.
Epistemic Value: The Insufficiency of Truth.Benoit Gaultier - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):303-316.


Added to PP index

Total views
34 ( #239,933 of 2,250,031 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #21,592 of 2,250,031 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature