Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1156-1164 (2011)

Authors
Muhammad Ali Khalidi
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
Microphysical realism is the position that the only real entities and properties are found at the most fundamental level of nature. In this article, I challenge microphysical realism concerning properties and natural kinds. One argument for microphysical realism about entities, the “nothing-but argument,” does not apply to properties and kinds. Another argument, the “causal exclusion argument,” cannot be sustained in light of modern physics. Moreover, this argument leads to an objection against microphysical realism, based on the “illusoriness of macroproperties.” Another objection is based on the possibility that there is no fundamental level but a “bottomless pit.”
Keywords scientific realism  causation  reductionism  supervenience  physicalism
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DOI 10.1086/662285
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References found in this work BETA

Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Concepts of Supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Is There a Fundamental Level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.

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