Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):1-43 (2016)

Authors
Justin Khoo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
The Ramseyan thesis that the probability of an indicative conditional is equal to the corresponding conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent is both widely confirmed and subject to attested counterexamples (e.g., McGee 2000, Kaufmann 2004). This raises several puzzling questions. For instance, why are there interpretations of conditionals that violate this Ramseyan thesis in certain contexts, and why are they otherwise very rare? In this paper, I raise some challenges to Stefan Kaufmann's account of why the Ramseyan thesis sometimes fails, and motivate my own theory. On my theory, the proposition expressed by an indicative conditional is partially determined by a background partition, and hence its probability depends on the choice of such a partition. I hold that this background partition is contextually determined, and in certain conditions is set by a salient question under discussion in the context. I show how the resulting theory offers compelling answers to the puzzling questions raised by failures of the Ramseyan thesis.
Keywords philosophy of language  conditionals  probability  context  questions
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Reprint years 2016
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DOI 10.1007/s10988-015-9182-z
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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