The Monist 99 (3):181-197 (2016)

Authors
Ian James Kidd
Nottingham University
Abstract
This paper offers an analysis of the structure of epistemic vice-charging, the critical practice of charging other persons with epistemic vice. Several desiderata for a robust vice-charge are offered and two deep obstacles to the practice of epistemic vice-charging are then identified and discussed. The problem of responsibility is that few of us enjoy conditions that are required for effective socialisation as responsible epistemic agents. The problem of consensus is that the efficacy of a vice-charge is contingent upon a degree of consensus between critic and target that is unlikely or impossible where vice-charging is most likely to be provoked. It emerges that a robust critical practice of vice-charging is possible in principle, but very difficult in practice.
Keywords virtue epistemology  epistemic vice
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1093/monist/onv035
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,447
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David K. Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

View all 52 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Vice and Motivation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):350-367.
Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
Deep Epistemic Vices.Ian James Kidd - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:43-67..

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Introduction: Virtue and Vice.Heather Battaly - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):1-21.
Epistemic malevolence.Jason Baehr - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):189-213.
Epistemic Self-Indulgence.Heather Battaly - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):214-234.
Epistemic Badness.Anthony T. Flood - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:253-262.
On Employee Vice.Dennis J. Moberg - 1997 - Business Ethics Quarterly 7 (4):41-60.
Is Scientism Epistemically Vicious?Ian James Kidd - 2017 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford University Press. pp. 222-249.
Epistemic vice.Casey Swank - 2000 - In Guy Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 195--204.
Collective Epistemic Agency: Virtue and the Spice of Vice.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2011 - In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos. pp. 45.
Courage, Evidence, And Epistemic Virtue.Osvil Acosta-Morales - 2006 - Florida Philosophical Review 6 (1):8-16.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-10-31

Total views
85 ( #108,542 of 2,330,441 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #44,734 of 2,330,441 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes