Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper we argue that ill persons are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice in the sense articulated by Fricker. Ill persons are vulnerable to testimonial injustice through the presumptive attribution of characteristics like cognitive unreliability and emotional instability that downgrade the credibility of their testimonies. Ill persons are also vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice because many aspects of the experience of illness are difficult to understand and communicate and this often owes to gaps in collective hermeneutical resources. We then argue that epistemic injustice arises in part owing to the epistemic privilege enjoyed by the practitioners and institutions of contemporary healthcare services—the former owing to their training, expertise, and third-person psychology, and the latter owing to their implicit privileging of certain styles of articulating and evidencing testimonies in ways that marginalise ill persons. We suggest that a phenomenological toolkit may be part of an effort to ameliorate epistemic injustice.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,466

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Injustice in Medicine and Healthcare.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2017 - In Ian James Kidd, Gaile Pohlhaus & José Medina (eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice. New York: Routledge. pp. 336-346.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust.Gloria Origgi - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.
A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice.Laura Beeby - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):479-486.
Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.David Coady - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
Epistemic Injustice and Religion.Ian James Kidd - 2017 - In Ian James Kidd, José Medina & Gaile Pohlhaus (eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice. New York: Routledge. pp. 386-396.
Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice.Katherine Hawley - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 283-99.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-07-01

Downloads
247 (#47,978)

6 months
20 (#50,187)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Havi Carel
University of Bristol
Ian James Kidd
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.
Distributive Epistemic Justice in Science.Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

View all 99 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.

View all 28 references / Add more references