Emotion, religious practice, and cosmopolitan secularism

Religious Studies (2):1-18 (2013)
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Abstract

Philip Kitcher has recently proposed a form of which he suggests could enable the members of a future secular society to continue to access and benefit from the moral and existential resources of the world's religions. I criticize this proposal by appeal to contemporary work on the role of emotion and practice in religious commitment. Using the work of John Cottingham and Mark Wynn, two objections are offered to the cosmopolitan secularists' claim that the moral resources of a religion could be both preserved by and employed within a secular society whose members lack emotional commitment to and practical engagement with the religions in question. I conclude that, pace Kitcher, cosmopolitan secularism cannot fulfil its promise to preserve the moral resources of religion in the absence of genuine religious traditions and communities

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Ian James Kidd
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Charging Others With Epistemic Vice.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):181-197.
Is Naturalism Bleak? A Reply to Holland and Cottingham.Ian James Kidd - 2013 - Environmental Values 22 (6):689-702.

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References found in this work

Philosophy inside out.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):248-260.
Militant Modern Atheism.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):1-13.
Life and meaning.David E. Cooper - 2005 - Ratio 18 (2):125–137.
Science, religion, and democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):pp. 5-18.

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