Pathocentric Epistemic Injustice and Conceptions of Health

In Benjamin Sherman & Stacey Goguen (eds.), Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 00-00 (forthcoming)

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that certain theoretical conceptions of health, particularly those described as ‘biomedical’ or ‘naturalistic’, are viciously epistemically unjust. Drawing on some recent work in vice epistemology, we identity three ways that abstract objects (such as theoretical conceptions, doctrines, or stances) can be legitimately described as epistemically vicious. If this is right, then robust reform of individuals, social systems, and institutions would not be enough to secure epistemic justice: we must reform the deeper conceptions of health that underlie them.

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2018-03-19

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Author Profiles

Ian James Kidd
Nottingham University
Havi Carel
University of Bristol

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Citations of this work

Revisiting Epistemic Injustice in the Context of Agency.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):703-706.

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