Philosophical Studies 128 (2):381-407 (2006)

Brian Kierland
Boise State University
There is a theory that one ought morally to do the best one can, when ‘best’ is suitably interpreted. There are also some examples in which, although every agent involved does the best she can, the group composed of them does not. Some philosophers think that these examples show the theory to be wrong. In particular, they think that such examples motivate a view which incorporates a requirement of cooperativeness in a particular way, though they disagree as to the exact nature of this requirement. This paper will argue both that such views are problematic and that the examples do not motivate departure from the original theory
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7789-y
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Utilitarianism and Co-Operation.Donald Regan - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Moral Obligation.Lou Goble - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):242-244.

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Citations of this work BETA

Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.
Non-Compliance Shouldn't Be Better.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):46-56.
The No Act Objection: Act‐Consequentialism and Coordination Games.Simon Rosenqvist - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):179-189.

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