Ratio 31 (3):294-302 (2018)

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule-following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking-belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.
Keywords Taking Condition  belief  inference  rule‐following  self‐consciousness
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DOI 10.1111/rati.12195
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References found in this work BETA

What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.
Comment on Paul Boghossian, "What is Inference".Crispin Wright - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):27-37.

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The Guise of Good Reason.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):204-224.

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