Ethics 125 (4):921-946 (2015)

Authors
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Abstract
If you ought to perform a certain act, and some other action is a necessary means for you to perform that act, then you ought to perform that other action as well – or so it seems plausible to say. This transmission principle is of both practical and theoretical significance. The aim of this paper is to defend this principle against a number of recent objections, which (as I show) are all based on core assumptions of the view called actualism. I reject actualism, provide an alternative explanation of its plausible features, and present an independent argument for the transmission principle.
Keywords transmission principle  actualism  possibilism  ought  reasons  ought implies can
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DOI 10.1086/680911
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References found in this work BETA

Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?Benjamin Kiesewetter & Jan Gertken - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.

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