In Thomas Metzinger & Wanja Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and predictive processing. Frankfurt, Germany: (2017)

Authors
Alex Kiefer
Monash University
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module.
Keywords Bayesian inference  Inference  Association  Perceptual inference  Free energy minimization  Generative models  Rationality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

View all 59 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

New Directions in Predictive Processing.Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):209-223.
Direct Perception and the Predictive Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3145-3164.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Beyond Inference in Perception.Stephen P. Stich - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:553 - 560.
Hallucinations and Perceptual Inference.Karl J. Friston - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):764-766.
A Defense of a Non-Computational, Interactive Model of Visual Observation.Bonnie Tamarkin Paller - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:135 - 142.
Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference.P. D. Magnus - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):303-315.
Bayes in the Brain—On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience.Matteo Colombo & Peggy Seriès - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):697-723.
Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
When Can Non‐Commutative Statistical Inference Be Bayesian?Miklós Rédei - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):129-132.
A Monstrous Inference Called Mahāvidyānumāna.Nirmalya Guha - 2016 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (3):557-579.
Psychoanalysis and the Practical Inference Mode.Thomas Donaldson - 1978 - Philosophy Research Archives 4:1-16.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-01-24

Total views
106 ( #102,803 of 2,454,537 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #30,303 of 2,454,537 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes