Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485-497 (2007)
In this paper, we show that presentism?the view that the way things are is the way things presently are?is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different from things and how things are
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References found in this work BETA
Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow', Reprinted with Postscripts In.David Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 2.
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Nefarious Presentism.Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):355-371.
The Way Things Were.Ben Caplan & David Sanson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.
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