The normativity of rationality

Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlin (2013)

Authors
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Technische Universität Dresden
Abstract
Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. This dissertation is concerned with the question of whether we ought (or have at least good reason) to avoid such irrationality. The thesis defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativity, such as the form and the content of rational standards or requirements, the preconditions of criti¬cism, and the function of reasons in deliberation and advice. Over and above an exten¬sive assessment of the problems discussed in the literature, the thesis provides a detailed defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, a novel, evidence-relative account of reasons, and an explanation of structural irrationality in terms of these accounts.
Keywords Rationality  Reasons  Normativity  Ought  Rational requirements  Practical deliberation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 56,949
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.
Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.

View all 34 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.
Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-06-25

Total views
259 ( #32,645 of 2,409,980 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #541,494 of 2,409,980 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes