Autonomy and false beliefs

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):513-531 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what the agent is reflecting upon. Whichever of these current formulations of autonomy we accept, reflection could be undertaken in full accordance with the conditions set, and yet the action fail to be autonomous. This will occur, I argue, if the agent is mistaken about the object of her reflection. More precisely, if she has a particular kind of false belief about the action she is contemplating undertaking, then no amount of reflection can render that action autonomous. This suggests the need for externalist conditions to be incorporated into an account of autonomy

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,873

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.François Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633-659.
Autonomous action and autonomy-subverting psychiatric conditions.David DeGrazia - 1994 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):279-297.
Autonomy Within Subservient Careers.James Rocha - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):313-328.
Agency, autonomy, and social intelligibility.William Hasselberger - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):255-278.
Believing Autonomously.Mark Leon - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:169-183.
Critical reflection, self-knowledge, and the emotions.Catriona Mackenzie - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):186-206.
Representing the agent through second-order states.David A. Jensen - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):69 - 88.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-02-08

Downloads
173 (#115,097)

6 months
22 (#129,521)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Suzy Killmister
Monash University

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 35 references / Add more references