Cartesian dualism and the unity of a mind

Mind 80 (July):337-353 (1971)
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The author indicates some ways in which cartesian dualists can counter strawson's argument that no cartesian mind can be identified either by itself or by other such minds. Judging the identification argument inconclusive, The author formulates what he regards as a more effective argument against cartesian dualism. The argument is to the effect that cartesian dualism promises no satisfactory account of the unity of a mind. Noting that a cartesian mind is presumed to be the subject of a multiplicity of simultaneous and successive experiences, The author thinks it legitimate to ask how the attribution of many experiences to the same subject is possible. He considers and rejects some answers that could be given in the framework of cartesian dualism



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Chin-Tai Kim
Case Western Reserve University

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