Authors
Junyeol Kim
Kookmin University
Abstract
The object reading of Frege's conception of truth holds that, for him, truth is an object---the truth-value the True. Greimann refutes the object reading and suggests an alternative reading. According to his suggested reading, Frege is the proponent of the assertion theory of truth the main thesis of which is that truth is what is expressed by the form of assertoric sentences and truth as such is neither an object nor a property. I argue that Frege cannot accept the assertion theory. I also defend the object reading by elaborating it further and replying to Greimann's criticisms.
Keywords Frege  Truth  Assertion
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DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.002
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