Authors
Junyeol Kim
Kookmin University
Abstract
I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the passage establishes that the indefinability argument is an arguably sound argument to the following conclusion: provided that the Fregean conception of judgment—which has recently been countered by Hanks—is correct and that truth is a property of truth-bearers, a vicious infinite regress is produced. Given this vicious regress, Frege chooses to reject that truth is a property of truth-bearers. Frege’s choice leads to a unique version of the Fregean conception of judgment. His unique conception of judgment can cope with Hanks’s recent criticisms against the Fregean conception.
Keywords Frege  Indefinability argument  Truth  Judgment
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DOI 10.15173/jhap.v9i5.4337
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References found in this work BETA

Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Primitivist Theory of Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
The Content–Force Distinction.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-164.
Logic and Truth in Frege.Thomas Ricketts & James Levine - 1996 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):121 - 175.

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