Abstract

In order for the liberalization and increase of international trade, the free trade agreement is generally deemed a most useful instrumentality within the region. Under the WTO regime, we can see that a plethora of FTA arrangements are negotiated, come into the treaty laws, as well as operate to regulate the binational or tri-national trade disputes on the regional basis. As most typical and frequented in FTAs, they usually include an arbitration and binational panel procedure as a dispute settlement mechanics. In many aspects, the procedures prescribed in most of FTAs could be apposite that most effectively and cheaply handle the disputes arising from the specific binational or trinational treaties. On the other hand, they could offer a chance to avoid the constitutional musters merely because diplomacy, international negotiation, ratification of treaties and approval of them traditionally fall within the powers of Congress or Executive under the separation of powers principle. This paper examined the legal issues as focused upon the NAFTA ch. 19, ch. 11 and US constitution. The chapters instituted the binational panel procedure dealing with the anti-dumping or counter measures as of subsidies, as well as legal dispute from the binational investment arrangements. From the consitutional viewpoint, we can be aware that the chapters could expressly contravene the Article III of original jurisdiction, Eleventh amendment of state sovereignty, and limitations of the treaty making powers inherent in the separation of powers principle. Given the overriding feature of such treaty clauses, the treaty should be ratified through the form of constitutional amendment, which requires a more stern step over most of the civilized constitutional states. The constitution is a supreme law in land, and represents a popular sovereignty as sheerly distinguished from the constitutional function of normal branches. When the special mechanics of dispute settlement may adopt an option of forum for escape, it is viewed that its unconstitutionality could yet be cured because the constitutional language of Article III original jurisdiction is considered mandatory or exclusive. I believe that the constitutional amendment procedure only could properly dispose such arrangements. While some areas of the presidential powers are deemed not subject to constitutional review as resorted upon the doctrine of political question or judicial self-restraint, the current jurisprudence gradually finds some limitations on the presidential power of foreign affairs including the treaty or war making provisions. As for a would-be treaty party of FTA, the constitutional issues raised in US is not entirely irrelevant to the Korean case ahead.