Abstract

The task of defining intentional action has given rise to heated debates in contemporary philosophy. I will show that it is not enough to fully understand the phenomena of intentional action by analyzing only the agent’s reasons that accompany each type of action. The solution for the problem generated by the Standard Account in explaining intentional action is to rethink the notion of intentional action and I approached the issue of intentional action by focusing on the role of normative considerations in determining whether an action was performed intentionally. The reason why we need to take normative considerations is derived from the falsity of the Simple View, which is to say that there is a gap between what is required for intending to Φ and what is sufficient for intentionally Φ-ing. By focusing on this aspect I provide a novel definition of intentional action. The definition recommends itself as being capable of dealing with many problems, including the problems raised by unintended side effects and lucky actions.