The circularity reading of Frege’s indefinability argument

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):128-136 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper criticizes the circularity reading of Frege's argument for the indefinability of truth. According to this reading, Frege is appealing to a sort of circularity in the argument. I argue that the circularity reading is interpretatively incorrect, or makes Frege's argument a non‐starter.

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Junyeol Kim
Chungbuk National University

Citations of this work

John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge.Guy Longworth & Simon Wimmer - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1547–1564.
Is Truth Primitive?Jeremy Wyatt - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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References found in this work

Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
Dummett on Frege. [REVIEW]Leslie Stevenson - 1974 - Philosophical Quarterly 24 (97):349-359.
Posthumous Writings.Gottlob Frege - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (1):101-103.
The Content–Force Distinction.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-164.

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