Titelbaum’s Theory of De Se Updating and Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty

Erkenntnis 80 (6):1217-1236 (2015)

Abstract

In his “Relevance of Self-locating Belief”, Titelbaum suggests a general theory about how to update one’s degrees of self-locating belief. He applies it to the Sleeping Beauty problem, more specifically, Lewis’s :171–176, 2001) version of that problem. By doing so, he defends the Thirder solution to the puzzle. Unfortunately, if we modify the puzzle very slightly, and if we apply his general updating theory to the thus modified version, we get the Halfer view as a result. In this paper, we will argue that the difference between the two versions of Sleeping Beauty isn’t sufficient for justifying the different verdicts on them. Since this is a counter-intuitive result, we should reject Titelbaum’s theory of de se updating

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Namjoong Kim
Gyeongsang National University

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