Erkenntnis 80 (6):1217-1236 (2015)
AbstractIn his “Relevance of Self-locating Belief”, Titelbaum suggests a general theory about how to update one’s degrees of self-locating belief. He applies it to the Sleeping Beauty problem, more specifically, Lewis’s :171–176, 2001) version of that problem. By doing so, he defends the Thirder solution to the puzzle. Unfortunately, if we modify the puzzle very slightly, and if we apply his general updating theory to the thus modified version, we get the Halfer view as a result. In this paper, we will argue that the difference between the two versions of Sleeping Beauty isn’t sufficient for justifying the different verdicts on them. Since this is a counter-intuitive result, we should reject Titelbaum’s theory of de se updating
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References found in this work
Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Adam Elga - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.