A more sophisticated Merton

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):266-271 (2009)

An alternative account of Merton to that provided by Turner is sketched. It shows strong similarities to some quite plausible contemporary understandings of science in general. Given this reading, it would seem that Merton did not drastically change his position nor does it suffer from the ambiguities that Turner describes. Key Words: theory • naturalism • causation • functional explanation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0048393109333441
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,385
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Social Theory and Social Structure.Lawrence Haworth - 1959 - Philosophy of Science 26 (1):53-53.
How Experiments End.Peter Galison - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):411-414.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Shrinking Merton.Stephen Turner - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (3):481-489.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Assault Badly Misses the Mark: (Comment on Stephen Turner).Piotr Sztompka - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):260-265.
R. K. Merton's Concepts of Function and Functionalism.Hugh Lehman - 1966 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 9 (1-4):274 – 283.
Turner on Merton.Joseph Agassi - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):284-293.


Added to PP index

Total views
48 ( #187,517 of 2,291,111 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #99,146 of 2,291,111 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature