Bivalence and the Sorites Paradox

American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1):17 - 25 (1979)
Putative resolutions of the sorites paradox in which the major premise is declared false or illegitimate, Including max black's treatment in terms of the alleged illegitimacy of vague attributions to borderline cases, Are rejected on semantical grounds. The resort to a non-Bivalent logic of representational "accuracy" with a continuum of accuracy values is shown to resolve the paradox, And the identification of accuracy values as truth values is defended as compatible with the central insight of the correspondence theory of truth and with the practical legitimacy of most applications of ordinary, Bivalent logic to statements involving vague predicates
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Bertil Rolf (1984). Sorites. Synthese 58 (2):219 - 250.

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